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Abstract
We consider oblivious transfer protocols performed over binary symmet-
ric channels in a malicious setting where parties will actively cheat if they
can. We provide constructions purely based on coding theory that achieve
an explicit positive rate, the essential ingredient being the existence of linear
codes whose Schur products are asymptotically good.
1 Introduction
A 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer is a cryptographic protocol between two players,
Alice, who owns two secrets, and Bob, who wishes to acquire one of them. The
protocol ensures that one of the secrets is delivered to Bob, while no information
about the other secret leaks: furthermore, Alice has no information about which
secret Bob selects.
1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocols were introduced by Even, Goldreich and
Lempel [10], though it was shown that they are equivalent to a variant originally
proposed by Rabin [19]. Oblivious transfer has found numerous applications since,
notably to multiparty computation [11]. Oblivious transfer was first considered in
the case of computationally bounded participants, but Cre´peau and Kilian later [8]
introduced the idea of unconditionally secure oblivious transfer, by considering the
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situation when the players have access to a noisy channel that they cannot control.
It is natural to view the noisy channel as a resource, and to use the number of
symbols sent over the channel as measure of the efficiency of the oblivious transfer
protocol. The first protocol achieving oblivious transfer of 1-bit secrets from a
binary symmetric channel (BSC) [8] required Ω(n11) transmitted bits over the
channel to guarantee a probability of protocol failure of 2−n. This was improved
by Cre´peau in [7], who obtained a protocol that requires only O(n3) uses of the
BSC for a one bit secret, and was later again improved by Cre´peau, Morozov and
Wolf [9] to O(n2 + ε).
The notion of oblivious transfer capacity was introduced in [17] and further devel-
oped in [1]. In this setting, the two secrets are not single bits anymore, but strings
of bits, and the oblivious transfer rate is defined as the quotient of the number of
bits of each secret divided by the number of bits transmitted over the channel: the
oblivious transfer capacity is then equal to the supremum of the set of achievable
rates. Oblivious transfer is studied in [1] in the semi-honest (or honest but curi-
ous) model, meaning that the players do not deviate from the protocol. In this
model it is shown that constant rate oblivious transfer is possible for most discrete
memoryless channels. Capacities are computed for some channels in [1], and lower
bounds provided for others, including the binary symmetric channel, though an
actual protocol is not proposed.
Later, Ishai et al. [14] improved the results of Cre´peau [7], and are the first to
show that constant rate oblivious transfer protocols are possible in a fully mali-
cious setting where both players will actively cheat if they can. The paper [14]
also devises a protocol that achieves efficient oblivious transfer of many 1-bit se-
crets in parallel. The protocols of [14] are quite intricate and call upon a number
of cryptographic primitives. In the present paper we again pick up the issue of
devising constant rate oblivious transfer protocols and apply a coding-theory ap-
proach to the problem. The end result consists of constant rate oblivious transfer
protocols that are more direct than that of [14] and that allow us to compute an
achievable rate that is of different order of magnitude than what could eventually
be derived from [14].1 Crucial to our protocols is the notion of Schur product of
a linear code C. The Schur product (or square) of a linear code C ⊂ Fnq is the
linear span of all coordinate-wise products c ∗ c′ = (c1c′1 · · · cnc′n) of codewords
c = (c1, . . . , cn), c
′ = (c′1, . . . , c
′
n) of C. The central ingredient in our construction
is a family of asymptotically good linear codes whose squares are also asymptot-
ically good. In the case of the binary alphabet, the existence of such families of
codes is far from immediate and they were not known to exist before the work of
Randriambololona [20]. In fact, during the early investigations leading up to this
1Y. Ishai, personal communication.
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work, we realised the usefulness of such codes but were unable to come up with a
construction, and inquiries into the matter provided motivation for the paper [20],
as is mentioned in its introduction. Codes with good squares also appear indi-
rectly in [14], since they are an essential component of the secret sharing schemes
with multiplicative properties that [14] calls upon. The use of codes with good
squares is arguably more direct in the present work. In the next section we give
an overview of our constructions and outline the structure of the paper.
2 Overview
We assume Alice and Bob have access to two channels: (1) a noiseless channel
and (2) a discrete memoryless channel. How unconditional oblivious transfer can
be achieved is best understood in the simple case of an erasure channel of erasure
probability p, say. First Alice generates a string r of 2n0 random bits and sends
them over the noisy channel. Bob will receive approximately 2pn0 erasures instead
of the original symbols. Bob then separates the index set [1, 2n0] of the received
symbols into two disjoint sets of equal size n0, i.e. [1, 2n0] = I ∪ J , in such a way
that all the erased symbols have their coordinates in one of the two sets (assuming
there are no more than n0 of them, which is typically the case when p < 1/2)
and communicates the sets I and J noiselessly to Bob. Denoting by rI and rJ
the corresponding two n0-bit strings derived from the bits initially sent by Alice,
she can now use them to send noiselessly to Bob x + rI and y + rJ where x and
y are some n0-bit vectors. With this procedure Alice sends to Bob the vectors x
and y through what amounts to two different channels, one of which is noiseless,
the other being in effect an erasure channel. Alice has no way of knowing which
of the two channels is the noiseless one, meaning she cannot know which secret
Bob will want, and from Bob’s side, whatever may be the way he chooses the two
sets I and J , at least one of the two vectors x and y will be submitted to an
erasure channel of erasure probability at least p. We remark now that all that is
needed to complete the protocol is to apply standard wiretap-channel techniques
to transmit messages through the vectors x and y that leak no information to an
eavesdropper that would access x and y through a channel of erasure probability
at least p. The oblivious transfer capacity for this honest but curious setting is
explicitly computed in [1] as a function of the error probability p.
We now focus on our central topic, namely the case when the noisy channel is
a binary symmetric channel. All known protocols start with the following bit
duplication trick, first introduced by Cre´peau and Kilian [8] and also used in [7].
Alice again generates a string r of 2n0 random bits, but this time every bit ri is
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sent over the noisy channel as a duplicate couple (ri, ri). We remark that whenever
a couple (0, 1) or (1, 0) is received, then either (0, 0) or (1, 1) must have been sent
with equal probability 1/2 at the receiver (Bob’s) end. Therefore Bob has no
choice than to consider this situation as an erasure, and what duplication achieves
is to transform the binary symmetric channel into a mixed channel with errors and
erasures. Again, Bob partitions the index set [1, 2n0] into two n0-bit sets I and
J , one of which indexes all the erased positions. This again creates two vectors
rI and rJ , one of which is received with more noise, namely a mixture of errors
and erasures, than the other which is erasure-free. We have effectively created
two virtual noisy channels one of which is noisier than the other, and such that
Alice does not know which is the noisiest. At this point we make the remark that
wire-tap channel techniques are again sufficient to extract from these two channels
a semi-honest oblivious transfer protocol. We develop this approach in Section
3, which requires a treatment of the somewhat non-standard mixed error-erasure
wiretap channels. The result is a constructive oblivious transfer protocol P0 for an
m-bit secret that is a generalisation of a protocol of [7] for 1-bit secrets, and that
achieves the lower bound on the oblivious transfer capacity computed in [1] for
a mixed error-erasure channel. The computations of [1] are purely information-
theoretic and no explicit schemes were suggested to achieve them. By optimising
over the channel parameter we obtain a positive rate R0 = 0.108 for this first
protocol P0. For the rate R of a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol (two secrets)
we use the following definition, consistent with [1]:
Definition 1. The rate R of an oblivious transfer protocol of one out of two m-bit
secrets is the ratio of the number of secrets bits, namely 2m, over the number N
of binary symbols transmitted over the channel.
Protocol P0 ensures that an honest but curious Bob will have no knowledge on
at least one of the two secrets. To measure the possible leakage of information
about a secret, we first view the two secrets as uniform and independent random
variables in {0, 1}m. We write them therefore as X, Y . The protocol P0 would be
ideal if we could state regarding Bob’s view that:
Either H(X|Y,O) = m
Or H(Y |X,O) = m
where O is what Bob observes during the protocol and H is Shannon’s entropy.
We prove a lower bound on H(X|Y,O) that explicitly states how close (in fractions
of bits) the protocol is from the ideal scenario.
Protocol P0 is only valid in a semi-honest model where Alice does not deviate
from her instructions. Alice’s goal in cheating is restricted to trying to figure out
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the secret that Bob wants (she is not interested in disrupting the protocol, i.e.
to make it fail). Contrary to the pure erasure channel case, Alice could actively
cheat by transmitting over the binary symmetric channel some falsely duplicated
bits ri under the form (0, 1) or (1, 0), instead of (ri, ri). If (0, 1) is sent over a
binary symmetric channel with transition probability p < 1/2, then the probability
p2 + (1 − p)2 that (0, 1) or (1, 0) is received (an erasure) is always larger than if
(0, 0) or (1, 1) had been transmitted. By sending a few tracker pairs of symbols
in this way, a tellingly large number of their indices will end up in the subset, I
or J corresponding to the secret that Bob does not want, thus yielding critical
information to Alice on which secret Bob is trying to acquire.
A crucial observation made by Cre´peau [7] is that the number of falsely duplicated
tracker bits ri that Alice can use can only be a limited portion of the total number
of bits transmitted over the noisy channel. This is because these bits have a higher
probability of turning up on Bob’s side as erasures, and if Bob receives too many
erased symbols, contradicting the law of large numbers, he will know that Alice
has almost certainly cheated. Hence if one repeats the protocol P0 many times,
say n20 times where n0 is (as above, up to a multiplicative constant) the number
of noisy channel uses for P0, this makes the number of channel uses equal to n
3
0,
and the number of corrupt tracker bits that Alice can get away with using without
arousing Bob’s suspicion, is, by the law of large numbers, not significantly more
than the order of n
3/2
0 : this implies that Alice has to be honest for the majority
of the n20 P0-protocols that are played out, otherwise she will be exposed with
probability tending to 1 with n0.
The following idea is then used by Cre´peau [7] to obtain an oblivious transfer
protocol secure against malicious participants that would cheat if they could. The
treatment of [7] focuses on oblivious transfer of single bit secrets, but it applies just
as well to string oblivious transfer. Apply n times the protocol P0 to intermediate
secret pairs xi, yj, i = 1, . . . , n. The strings xi ∈ {0, 1}m are chosen randomly such
that x1 + · · ·+xn = s and the yi are defined as yi = xi+s+ t, i = 1, . . . , n, where s
and t are Alice’s secrets to be obliviously transferred. Now to foil Alice’s tracking
strategy, Bob will, for every i, randomly ask for either xi or yi, taking care only
to ask for an even number of yi
′s if he wishes to eventually acquire s, and an odd
number of yi
′s if he wishes to acquire t. We see that summing all the intermediate
secrets Bob has acquired yields either s or t according to his wish, and Alice who
can only cheat on a fraction of the P0 protocols, obtains no information on the
eventual secret, s or t, obtained by Bob.
The above repetition scheme gives vanishing rates however. The core strategy
developed in the present paper is to again repeat n times the protocol P0, but to
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replace the condition x1 + · · ·+ xn = s by a generalised condition
H
x1...
xn
 = s (1)
where H is a suitably chosen binary r × n matrix, yielding secrets s and t of
length rm rather than m (every coefficient of s lives in {0, 1}m). It turns out that
central among the required properties of H is that it generates a binary linear code
with a square that has a large minimum distance. We develop this approach in
Section 4 where we propose first an oblivious transfer protocol P1 that prevents
Alice from cheating but introduces cheating possibilities for Bob (whose goal is
to obtain information about the other secret than the one being asked), and then
introduce a variation P ′1 of P1 which prevents both Alice and Bob from cheating.
The protocol P ′1 adds to the protocol P1 a compression function applied to s and
t. These protocols achieve a positive rate of respectively R1 ≈ 0.69 10−4 and
R′1 ≈ 0.34 10−4.
In Section 5, we introduce generalisations P2 and P
′
2 of protocols P1 and P
′
1 that
replace the binary code generated by H in (1) by a q-ary code, for q a power of 2.
This allows us to use algebraic geometry codes with a much improved rate, with
the drawback that the protocol P0 has to be replaced by a less efficient 1-out-of-q
semi-honest oblivious transfer protocol. Overall, the rates of the protocols P2 and
P ′2 improve upon P1 and P
′
1, giving R2 ≈ 1/1250, R′2 ≈ 1/2500.
We finish this overview with a formal definition of oblivious transfer considered in
the malicious case.
Definition 2. Given a noiseless channel with unlimited usage and a binary sym-
metric channel (BSC), a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol of rate R consists
of a two player protocol where one player, Alice, possesses two secrets s and t of
m bits, and the second player, Bob, asks Alice for one of the two secrets. The
protocol uses communication over both channels and should satisfy the following
properties:
1. The ratio of the number 2m = |s| + |t| of secrets bits over the total number
N of binary symbols transmitted over the noisy channel is R.
2. The protocol is correct, meaning that if Bob follows the protocol, he will
obtain the secret he wishes with probability that tends to 1 when N goes to
infinity.
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3. Bob, whether he cheats or not, has virtually no information on at least one
secret, meaning
Either H(S|T,O) ≥ H(S)− δ
Or H(T |S,O) ≥ H(T )− δ
where S and T are s and t viewed as random variables with uniform distri-
bution, O is what Bob observes during the protocol and δ is a quantity that
tends to 0 when N goes to infinity.
4. A cheating Alice who is trying to gain non-trivial information on which se-
cret Bob is asking for will either fail at obtaining anything or be accused of
cheating by Bob with probability tending to 1 when N goes to infinity. It may
happen that Bob accuses Alice of cheating when she is behaving honestly, but
this happens with probability that tends to 0 when N goes to infinity.
We remark that:
(1) In what follows, we will always assume that the secrets of Alice are two inde-
pendent uniformly distributed strings. This assumption is made without loss
of generality. Indeed, since the noiseless channel is assumed to be available at
no cost, Alice may always one-time pad her secrets s and t by computing s + x
and t + y and communicating them noiselessly to Bob, for some independent
uniform random strings x and y. After this, oblivious transfer of the secrets s
and t is equivalent to oblivious transfer of the random strings x and y.
(2) This condition on secrecy used in [1] is H(KZ¯ |Z,O), where Z is a random vari-
able that models the choice of a secret, and KZ¯ represents the secret which was
not chosen. Our condition is slightly stronger since it assumes the complete
knowledge of one secret is given. Deviating from the definition of [1] was re-
quired since it makes no sense in the malicious context to model the choice of a
secret by a binary random variable. Indeed, we will see that in some instances
Bob can try to extract from the protocol some mixture of partial information
from both secrets.
Our main results are the protocols P1, P2 and P
′
1, P
′
2. Protocols P
′
1 and P
′
2 satisfy
Definition 2 with all probabilities that are required to tend to zero doing so subex-
ponentially, i.e. scaling as exp(−Nα) for 0 < α < 1. The quantity δ in Point 3.
of the definition is also subexponential in N . Protocols P1 and P2 are preliminary
versions of protocols P ′1 and P
′
2 where only Alice is fully malicious while Bob is
assumed to be honest-but-curious.
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3 A First Binary Oblivious Transfer Protocol
Alice and Bob have access to two channels: (1) a noiseless channel and (2) a binary
symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability ϕ < 1/2. The binary field
over {0, 1} is denoted by F2, and for a ∈ F2, a¯ denotes the other element of F2.
The protocol P0 below is a slight variation of the oblivious transfer proposed by
Cre´peau in [7], allowing Alice’s two secrets to be strings of m = n0(1− h( ϕ2(1−)))
bits, instead of 1 bit, where h denotes the binary entropy function, and where we
have set  = 2ϕ(1− ϕ). The total number of noisy channel uses is N = 4n0.
Protocol P0. Alice has two (column) secrets x, y ∈ Fm2 . Alice and Bob agree
on an ((n0 − k) +m)× n0 binary matrix H′ of the form
H′ =
[
H0
H1
]
where H0 is the parity check matrix of some (n0, k) linear code C0, which is
capacity achieving over a BSC with crossover probability ϕ
2
(1−) , and comes with
an efficient decoding algorithm, while H1 is chosen uniformly at random.
1. Alice generates a string r = (r1, . . . , r2n0) of 2n0 random bits and sends
2n0 pairs (ri, ri) of random bits to Bob over the BSC.
2. For every pair of the form (ri, ri) or (r¯i, r¯i), Bob decides that the bit ri
or r¯i is successfully received. He declares an erasure if he receives (ri, r¯i)
or (r¯i, ri). Bob partitions the indices [1, 2n0] into two sets: I has size
n0 and contains only indices corresponding to successfully received bits,
while J , also of size n0, contains the rest of the indices. This is assuming
that Bob wants to know the secret x: if instead he prefers the secret
y, then he will reverse the roles of I and J . To each set corresponds a
string of noisy random bits r′I and r
′
J . For r
′
I , the noise comes from Bob
accepting (r¯i, r¯i) while Alice sent (ri, ri). For r
′
J , the noise also includes
erasures. Bob sends both sets of indices I and J to Alice over the noiseless
channel. Alice then permutes uniformly at random elements in I and in
J and sends the permutations to Bob over the noiseless channel.
3. Alice picks uniformly at random two (column) codewords cx and cy ∈ C1
that satisfy respectively
H′cx =
[
0
x
]
, H′cy =
[
0
y
]
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and sends cx + rI and cy + rJ to Bob over the noiseless channel.
4. Bob computes (cx+rI)+r
′
I to find c
′
x, a noisy version of cx. Bob decodes
c′x, recovers cx, and computes H1cx = x.
The protocol P0 requires 2n0 uses of the BSC channel for each secret. It provides
an oblivious transfer protocol provided that Alice is honest.
Suppose both Alice and Bob are honest. If Alice is honest and sends pairs
of the form (ri, ri), Bob receives (ri, ri) with probability (1− ϕ)2 and (r¯i, r¯i) with
probability ϕ2. He will decide an erasure with probability 2ϕ(1 − ϕ) =  < 1/2,
and accept a bit with probability 1 − . This can be seen as an instance of an
imperfect binary erasure channel (BEC) with erasure probability : when Bob
decides that a random bit is correctly received, there is still a probability ϕ2 of
getting the wrong random bit.
• Since Bob accepts a pair of random bits with probability 1 −  ( < 1/2),
he should receive on average 2(1 − )n0 non-erased symbols, and I can be
assumed of size n0.
• The string r′I is rI affected by an additive noise, that is r′I = rI + e, where
e is an error vector, which contains a 1 whenever Alice sent (ri, ri) and
Bob received (r¯i, r¯i). If Alice is honest, a bit flip happens with probability
ϕ2, thus the proportion of bit flips among the bits that are not erased is
2n0ϕ2
2n0(1−) , yielding, by restricting over the non-erased bits, a binary symmetric
channel (BSC) with crossover probability ϕ
2
(1−) . It is enough that the chosen
error capability of the code allows an honest Bob to recover cx. However,
by choosing a code which is capacity achieving, n0 is minimized, and m is
maximized, as shown below, while discussing the optimization of R0, the
rate of P0. Polar codes [2] provide examples of capacity achieving codes for
the BSC which furthermore come with an efficient decoding algorithm.
Suppose Bob is dishonest. We now check that Bob, even if he is dishonest and
deviates from the protocol by putting indices of erased positions in both sets I and
J , will not recover any information about at least one of the two secrets, that is, he
cannot recover information involving both cx and cy. Bob gets roughly 2n0(1− )
bits (the rest being erased), he can thus partition the 2n0 bits into two groups
9
in any way he wants, where I will have some bits erased, some not, and the rest
will be in J . Bob will receive some c′x and c
′
y, which are noisy versions of cx and
cy respectively, with noise depending on the choice of I and J . These noises can
be seen as the result of a transmission through a channel between Alice and Bob
that behaves as a mixture of an erasure channel and a binary symmetric channel.
Concretely, the noisiest of the two channels will have an average proportion of
erased symbols that is at least , and its non-erased symbols are all submitted to a
binary symmetric channel of transition probability ϕ2/(1− ), as they were before
the partition into I and J , since Bob has no way of differentiating symbols in error
from error-free symbols.
For the purposes of the present study, let us call a binary symmetric channel with
erasures of parameters e ∈ [1, n0] and 0 ≤ p < 1/2, where e is an integer, a channel
which acts on strings of n0 bits in the following way:
– it erases e coordinates chosen uniformly among all possible
(
n0
e
)
patterns (in
the protocol P0, Alice permutes the indices in I and J uniformly at random),
– it applies a binary symmetric channel of transition probability p to the re-
maining n0 − e symbols.
We will rely on the following result:
Lemma 3. Let C be a binary code of length n and rate R, and let CX be a random
variable with values in C and uniform distribution. Let CX be submitted to a binary
symmetric channel with erasures of parameters e and p, and let Z be the output
variable. Define the conditional min-entropy of CX given Z = z by
H∞(CX |Z = z) = − log max
c∈C
P (CX = c|Z = z).
Then, for all α > 0, with probability that tends to 1 exponentially in n, a vector z
is received such that
H∞(CX |Z = z) ≥ n[R− (1− e/n)(1− h(p))− α].
The proof of Lemma 3 is given in the Appendix.
In the case under study, the value of e may vary, but the probability that e/n0
falls significantly below  = 2ϕ(1 − ϕ), i.e. is separated from  by a constant, is
exponentially small in n0. To obtain a uniformly distributed secret from the trans-
mitted codeword cx or cy in the protocol P0, it suffices to hash it to a sufficiently
smaller string, which is exactly the purpose of the multiplication by H1. Since the
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set of multiplications by H1 makes up a universal family of hash functions, we will
invoke the Leftover Hash Lemma [12, Lemma 4.5.1] [3, Theorem 3] to evaluate
how close the protocol P0 is from the ideal scenario
Either H(X|Y,O) = m (2)
Or H(Y |X,O) = m (3)
where we view the two secrets x and y as uniform and independent random vari-
ables X, Y in {0, 1}m and O is what Bob observes during protocol P0. The nature
of protocol P0 is such that H(X|Y,O) = H(X|O), because X and Y are really
transmitted over two independent channels. Without loss of generality we assume
that X is transmitted over the noisiest of the two channels. We have the following
lower bound on H(X|O):
Theorem 4. Suppose protocol P0 is implemented with some (n0, k) linear code C0
of rate R0 = k/n0. For any ε > 0, whenever the length m of the secret satisfies
m ≤ n0[R0 − (1− )(1− h( ϕ21−))− ε], then H(X|O) ≥ m− f0(ε,m), for f0(ε,m)
exponentially small in m.
Proof. What is observed by Bob is a noisy version z of a codeword c sent through
a binary symmetric channel with erasures of parameters e and p = ϕ2/(1 − ),
with e/n0 arbitrarily close to . Lemma 3 claims that with probability tending
to 1 (exponentially in n0, meaning with probability 1 − exp(−n0)), Bob observes
ω = z such that the min-entropy H∞(c|O = ω) of the transmitted codeword c is
at least n0[R0 − (1 − e/n0)(1 − h(p))] − αn0, with α arbitrarily small. We then
invoke Theorem 3 of [3] and the fact that the Renyi entropy is never less than the
min-entropy to claim that, since X = H1c, we have
H(X|O = ω,H1) = H(H1c|Z = z,H1) ≥ m− 2m−n0[R0−(1−e/n0)(1−h(p))]+αn0−log2 ln 2.
Since m ≤ n0[R0−(1−)(1−h( ϕ21−))]−ε, then m−n0[R0−(1−e/n0)(1−h(p))]+
αn0 − log2 ln 2 ≤ −4βn0 for some β = β(ε) > 0, which shows that we are already
close to m in a way which is exponential in n0, given H1. Next, we remove the
dependency on H1. We just showed that on average over H1,
H(X|O = ω,H1) ≥ m− 2−4βn0 . (4)
Suppose now that we were to be unlucky and choose H1 in the set of H1 of “bad”
matrices h (that may depend on ω) such that H(X|O = ω,H1 = h) ≤ m−2−2βn0 .
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Since
H(X|O = ω,H1) =
∑
h∈H1∪H1
P (H1 = h)H(X|O = ω,H1 = h)
≤
∑
h∈H1
P (H1 = h)(m− 2−2βn0) +
∑
h∈H1
P (H1 = h)m
= −
∑
h∈H1
P (H1 = h)2
−2βn0 +
∑
h∈H1∪H1
P (H1 = h)m
= m− 2−2βn0
∑
h∈H1
P (H1 = h),
we upper bound the quantity H(X|O = ω,H1) by
H(X|O = ω,H1) ≤ m− 2−2βn0Pu
where Pu is the probability to choose H1 = h in H1. Together with (4) the above
inequality implies that Pu ≤ 2−2βn0 . Therefore with probability 1−Pu ≥ 1−1/22βn0
over the choice of the random matrix H1, we have
H(X|O = ω) ≥ m− 2−2βn0 .
Now Lemma 3 does not exclude the existence of a “bad” event ω ∈ Ω1, for which
we cannot guarantee (4). But we can write
H(X|O) =
∑
ω∈Ω1∪Ω1
P (O = ω)H(X|O = ω)
≥
∑
ω∈Ω1
P (O = ω)(m− 2−2βn0)
= (m− 2−2βn0)(1− 2−γn0)
where 2−γn0 is the probability of a bad event ω.
We make the final remark that the above computation assumed that e/n0 is arbi-
trarily close to . Of course, the number of erasures can deviate significantly from
the average: but this happens with probability exponentially small in n0, so that
again this rare event can only diminish H(X|O) by a quantity exponentially small
in n0.
Corollary 5. If C0 is capacity-achieving on the erasureless channel, meaning the
code C0 has a vanishing decoding error probability for a BSC of parameter p =
ϕ2/(1−) and a rate R0 arbitrarily close to 1−h( ϕ21−), and if m ≤ n0[1−h( ϕ
2
1−)−ε],
then Bob can only obtain a vanishingly small number of bits of information on one
of the two secrets.
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Figure 1: (1− h(ϕ2/(1− ))) is shown as a function of the erasure probability 
of the imperfect BEC.
Optimization of the length m and of the rate R0. Finally, m is maximized
by maximizing R0, that is by having Alice use a capacity achieving code for the
relevant BSC channel, for which Corollary 5 has just told us that we may set
m = n0(1− h( ϕ21−)− ε),
for an arbitrarily small positive ε. This gives us an oblivious transfer rate (see
Definition 1) arbitrarily close to
R0 = m
2n0
=
n0(1− h( ϕ21−))
2n0
= ϕ(1− ϕ)
(
1− h
(
ϕ2
1− 2ϕ(1− ϕ)
))
.
This is the lower bound on the oblivious transfer capacity found by Alshwede and
Csisza´r in [1, Example 1]. What this shows is therefore that we incur no penalty
on the achievable oblivious transfer rate by assuming a possibly malicious Bob as
opposed to the honest but curious Bob of [1].
The optimal value of m is obtained when ϕ ≈ 0.198,  ≈ 0.31, for which (1 −
h( ϕ
2
1−)) ≈ 0.216 (see Figure 1) and
R0 ≈ 0.216n0
2n0
= 0.108.
Suppose Alice is dishonest. She might send a pair of the form (r¯i, ri). Now Bob
will receive (r¯i, ri) or (ri, r¯i), that is an erasure, with probability ϕ
2 + (1− ϕ)2 =
1 −  > 1/2, in which case he will put the index i in the more “noisy” set J .
Since it is more likely that a symbol of the form (ri, r¯i) stays an erasure (rather
than being changed into the valid symbol (ri, ri) or (r¯i, r¯i)), by tracking which set
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contains the most indices on which she cheated, she can guess which is more likely
to be I or J . For this reason, the protocol P0 is only valid in a semi-honest model
where Alice is assumed not to deviate from the protocol.
To obtain a protocol valid against a malicious Alice that will send falsely duplicated
pairs of the form (r¯i, ri), we may repeat n = n
2
0 times the protocol P0, as in
[7] and as sketched in Section 2. If Alice is honest, the first time, she sends
(r1,1r1,1), . . . , (r1,2n0r1,2n0), the second time, she sends (r2,1r2,1), . . . , (r2,2n0r2,2n0),
. . .. Let Z be the random variable counting the number of valid (i.e. non-erased)
bits that Bob should receive. It is binomially distributed, with mean E[Z] =
2nn0(1− ), and standard deviation σ =
√
2nn0(1− ).
Suppose now Alice is dishonest, and that she cheats by sending M falsely du-
plicated pairs out of the total 2nn0 transmitted pairs for all the n iterations of
protocol P0. Every time she cheats and sends (r¯i,jri,j), Bob will declare an erasure
with probability 1− , therefore the average number of valid bits that Bob will get
is
E[Z] = (2nn0 −M)(1− ) +M = 2nn0(1− )−M(1− 2), (5)
with  < 1/2. If Alice cheats at least once on every one of the n instances of the
protocol P0 (so that M ≥ n), then for n = n20, the typical value of Z will deviate
from 2nn0(1 − ) by a quantity that is much too close to n20 than the standard
deviation of Z, that behaves as n
3/2
0 , allows. This tells Bob that Alice is cheating.
A bit more specifically, Bob will set a threshold τ to be equal to
τ = 2nn0 (1− − η) with η = 1
4n0
(1− 2), (6)
which is exactly midway between the expected number 2nn0(1 − ) of unerased
symbols he should receive if Alice does not try to cheat and the expected number
(5) of unerased symbols he should receive if Alice cheats sufficiently many times
(M = n) to access his secret. Bob will declare that Alice cheats if the number
of unerased symbols that he receives falls below the threshold τ . The Chernov-
Hoeffding inequality tells us that the probability that Alice succeeds in cheating
without being accused scales as exp(−η22nn0), and similarly that the probability
that Bob wrongly accuses Alice of cheating is also exp(−η22nn0). With n = n20,
we have exp(−η22nn0) = exp(−n0).
More generally, we note that Alice’s cheating will be almost surely noticed when-
ever the number M of corrupted bits she sends satisfies
M  √nn0. (7)
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Conversely, whenever the order of magnitude of M stays below
√
nn0, she gets
away with her behaviour. We notice in particular that to prevent Alice from
cheating on at least one bit for every instance of P0, the number n of times the
protocol P0 must be repeated has to satisfy n n0.
In the next section we further exploit this strategy of repeating n times P0 to
devise an efficient oblivious transfer protocol secure against a cheating Alice.
4 A Positive Rate Binary Oblivious Transfer Pro-
tocol
4.1 A protocol that defeats Alice’s cheating strategy
We recall the definition of a Schur product of codes over the finite field Fq, for q
a prime power. Schur products were possibly explicitly first used in Coding The-
ory for decoding applications [18] and later came under attention in cryptographic
contexts, in part because of their relevance to secret sharing and multiparty com-
putation. For details on applications see the introduction of [5] and for a survey
of their properties see [21].
Definition 6. Given a q-ary linear code C of length n, for q a prime power, the
Schur product (or square) of C, denoted Cˆ, is defined as the linear span of all
componentwise products c ∗ c′ of code vectors c, c′ of C, i.e.
Cˆ = 〈c ∗ c′, c, c′ ∈ C〉
with
c ∗ c′ = (c1c′1, . . . , cnc′n).
We will denote the length, the dimension, and the minimum Hamming distance of
the code C and the code Cˆ respectively by [n, r, d] and [n, rˆ, dˆ].
For the moment we restrict ourselves to q = 2. Let now H be an r × n binary
matrix of rank r whose ith row is denoted by Hi, so that
H =
H1...
Hr

satisfying
HiH
ᵀ
j = δij, i, j = 1, . . . , n. (8)
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The protocol P1 described below provides an oblivious transfer between Alice and
Bob, assuming this time that Bob is honest (but not Alice). We will from now on
use the letter m to denote the secret size in protocol P0: the secret size in protocol
P1 will be equal to rm, for an integer r equal to the dimension of a binary linear
code C that we now introduce.
Protocol P1. Alice and Bob agree on an r×n binary matrix H satisfying (8),
which forms the generator matrix of an [n, r, d] code C. The dimension r of C
and the minimum distance dˆ of the square Cˆ should both be linear in n.
Alice has two secrets
s =
s1...
sr
 , t =
t1...
tr

with coefficients si, ti in Fm2 .
1. Alice then picks uniformly at random a vector x = [x1, . . . , xn], xi ∈ Fm2 ,
such that
Hxᵀ = s
and computes
y = x +
r∑
j=1
(sj + tj)Hj = [y1, . . . , yn], yi ∈ Fm2 , (9)
such that Hyᵀ = t.
2. Bob computes a binary vector u = [u1, . . . , un] ∈ Fn2 which is orthogonal
to Cˆ.
3. If Bob wants the secret s (respectively t), then for every coefficient u` of
u, Bob asks Alice through the protocol P0 for the string
• x` ∈ Fm2 (respectively y`) if u` = 0,
• y` ∈ Fm2 (respectively x`) if u` = 1.
4. After n rounds of the protocol P0, Alice has sent Bob the requested
n-tuple v = [v1, . . . , vn] which may be expressed as
v = x ∗ (1 + u) + y ∗ u if Bob requested s (10)
v = x ∗ u + y ∗ (1 + u) if Bob requested t (11)
5. Once Bob gets v, he computes Hvᵀ to recover s (or t).
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We first remark that in the simple case when the matrix H is a single row made
up of the all-one vector, H = [1, 1, . . . , 1], then the protocol P1 reduces to the
string version of Cre´peau’s oblivious transfer protocol sketched in Section 2. We
now check that in the general case, protocol P1 does what is required of it when
the players do not try to deviate. We need to check that Bob indeed recovers s or
t and obtains no information on the other secret.
Suppose both Alice and Bob are honest.
• As needed in Step 1 of P1, the vector y = x+
∑r
j=1(sj + tj)Hj = [y1, . . . , yn],
yi ∈ Fm2 , satisfies
Hyᵀ = t.
Indeed, from (8), HHᵀj = ej, where ej is the weight 1 column vector with 1
at the jth position, and
Hyᵀ = Hxᵀ +
r∑
j=1
(sj + tj)HH
ᵀ
j = s +
r∑
j=1
(sj + tj)ej = s + (s + t) = t.
• To show that Bob can recover s or t by computing Hvᵀ in Step 5 of P1, we
first remark that v can be expressed as a Schur product
v = x + u ∗ (x + y) = [x1 + u1(x1 + y1), . . . , xn + un(xn + yn)],
if Bob wants s, or
v = x+(u+1)∗ (x+y) = [x1 +(u1 +1)(x1 +y1), . . . , xn+(un+1)(xn+yn)],
if Bob wants t, according to (10) and (11). Now Bob gets v, and computes
Hvᵀ = s + H(u ∗ (x + y))ᵀ = s + H(u ∗ (
r∑
j=1
(sj + tj)Hj))
ᵀ,
since y = x +
∑r
j=1(sj + tj)Hj, and
H(u∗(
r∑
j=1
(sj + tj)Hj))
ᵀ = H(
r∑
j=1
(sj + tj)(u∗Hj))ᵀ =
r∑
j=1
(sj + tj)H(u∗Hj)ᵀ.
Now the ith row of the vector H(u ∗Hj)ᵀ is
Hi(u ∗Hj)ᵀ =
n∑
k=1
HikukHjk = u(Hi ∗Hj)ᵀ.
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Since u is orthogonal to Cˆ, u(Hi ∗Hj)ᵀ = 0, and as desired, Bob gets s. Now
if u + 1 is used instead of u, we have
H((u + 1) ∗ (x + y))ᵀ = H(u ∗ (x + y) + x + y)ᵀ = H(x + y)ᵀ
and Bob gets t.
Additionally, we remark that Bob has obtained s (say) and v1 ∈ (Fm2 )n given by
(10) and that protocol P0 guarantees that he essentially has no information on the
coefficients of the other n-tuple v2 given by (11). More precisely, the argument
above shows that in an idealised version of protocol P0, where (2) and (3) hold,
Bob has no information from v2 in the sense that, given v1 and s, all possible
values for t = Hvᵀ2 are equally likely, in other words Bob has no information on
t. Let us now prove that Bob has almost no knowledge on t, even when given v1
(which implies knowledge of s), and the actual output of protocol P0. Given v1, (9)
proves that, for every fixed vector u chosen by Bob, the vector v2 lives in a code
whose codewords are in one-to-one correspondence with the values of t. Let us
denote by V2 the random variable equal to v2 with distribution conditioned by the
knowledge of v1, (which does not depend on the actual value of v1). We have that
protocol P0 transforms every coordinate (V2)` of V2, ` = 1 . . . n, into an n0-tuple Z
of {0, 1, ∗}n0 (where ∗ denotes an erasure), in a way that is memoryless and without
feedback. In other words, the distribution of Z` conditional on (V2)` is the same as
the distribution of Z` conditional on (V2)1, . . . , (V2)`, and the distribution of (V2)`
conditional on (V2)1, . . . (V2)`−1 and Z1, . . . , Z`−1 is the same as the distribution of
(V2)` conditional on (V2)1, . . . (V2)`−1 alone. These properties are well-known (e.g.
[6, Ch. 7]) to imply that
I(V2, Z) ≤
n∑
`=1
I((V2)`, Z`).
From Theorem 4 we have I((V2)`, Z`) ≤ f0(m, ε), from which we get, since H(V2) =
H(T ) = rm,
H(T |O) ≥ H(V2|O) ≥ rm− nf0(m, ε),
where T is t viewed as a random variable with uniform distribution and O is Bob’s
view of the whole protocol. In other words, the amount of information leaked in
the whole process is at most nf0(m, ε). We have thus proved the following:
Corollary 7. Suppose that protocol P1 is implemented using an [n, r, d] code C
satisfying the requirements, and used by an honest Alice who owns two secrets s
and t of length r (linear in n), i.e. in (Fm2 )r, and an honest Bob. Then
H(T |S,O) ≥ rm− nf0(m, ε),
where ε and f0(m, ε) are as in Theorem 4 and in particular f0(m, ε) is exponentially
small in m.
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Suppose Alice is dishonest. In Step 3 of P1, Bob asks Alice for either x` or
y` via protocol P0. If Alice is honest, she has no information on whether Bob is
asking for x` or for y`. Now we know that Alice can cheat in protocol P0, and
might guess whether Bob is asking for x` or y`: however, among the n iterations of
P0, Alice can only cheat up to M times while staying under the radar, as long as
(from (7)) M stays below a linear function of
√
(# channel uses for P0)n. Keeping
the notation of Section 3, take n linear in n20 (say), so that M cannot exceed a
quantity linear in
√
n0n = n
3/2
0 = n
3/4.
Obtaining information on whether Bob asks for x` or for y` is equivalent to ob-
taining information on the `-th coefficient u` of the vector u = (u1, . . . , un). Now
u is randomly chosen in Cˆ⊥, therefore the M ≈ n3/4 coefficients seen by Alice will
be distributed uniformly at random in {0, 1}M as long as M is less or equal to the
dual minimum Hamming distance of Cˆ⊥ (see [15], Ch.5. §5. Theorem 8), which
is the minimum Hamming distance of Cˆ set to be linear in n, assuming for the
moment that such codes exist. Therefore, Alice cannot differentiate with only M
values of u whether Bob is asking for s of for t: Alice’s cheating strategy is foiled.
To be more specific, Alice can only gain something from her cheating attempt if
she cheats on M instances of P0 with M exceeding the Hamming distance of Cˆ,
i.e. M ≥ cn for some constant c. As discussed at the end of Section 3, Bob will
set a threshold τ as in (6), with the value η being adjusted to η = c
4n0
(1− 2), so
that τ sits exactly between the expected number of unerased symbols he should
receive when Alice does not try to cheat, and the expected number of symbols he
will receive when Alice chooses M = cn. Again, the probability that either Alice
cheats successfully without being caught and the probability that Bob wrongly
accuses Alice of cheating both scale like exp(−n0).
We are left to show that codes C with all the required properties exist. The code
C should have positive rate, i.e. its dimension r should be a linear function of n,
so that the oblivious transfer protocol has positive rate. As we have just seen, the
minimum distance dˆ should be large enough. We note that the protocol would
still work with a code C such that dˆ is o(n). However, whatever the value of n
viewed as a function of n0, we will always need dˆ n1/2 which exceeds what one
obtains with straightforward constructions. In [20], H. Randriambololona showed
the existence of asymptotically good Schur codes, that is, with both dimension r
and product minimum Hamming distance dˆ linear in n. These codes will therefore
suit our purposes. To be complete, we just need to show that we may incorporate
the extra requirement (8). We do this below.
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Existence of a suitable code. We will show that punctured subcodes of the
codes of [20] satisfy all the requirements of protocol P1. Recall that if C ⊂ Fnq is
a linear code, and if I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} is a subset of coordinate positions, then the
punctured code CI on the subset I is the set of vectors of length n− |I|
xI := (xi)i∈{1,...,n}\I
obtained from all codewords of x = (x1, . . . , xn) of C. If d is the minimum distance
of C, and if the number |I| of punctured positions is < d, then the dimension of
the punctured code CI equals the dimension of C, and the minimum distance of
CI is at least d− |I|. We rely on the following lemma, that we state in a general
q-ary case since we shall require it in non-binary form in the next section. Let us
say that the vectors H1, H2, . . . , Hr in Fnq make up an orthonormal basis of C if
they satisfy (8). We shall use the notation (A |B) for the scalar product ABᵀ of
vectors A and B.
Lemma 8. Let q be a power of 2 and let Fq be the associated finite field. Let
C ⊂ Fnq be a linear code of dimension r and minimum distance d > r. Then
there exists a subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of at most r coordinate positions, such that
puncturing C on the set I yields a code of dimension r that has an orthonormal
basis.
Proof. Note that the condition d > r ensures that puncturing on at most r posi-
tions does not decrease the code dimension.
We start with a systematic generating matrix of C: denoting byB1, . . . , Br its rows,
we have, for j = 1, 2, . . . , r, that the j-th coordinate Bij of Bi equals Bij = δij.
Let I1 = ∅ if (B1 |B1) 6= 0 and I1 = {1} if (B1 |B1) = 0. In both cases we therefore
have (BI11 |BI11 ) 6= 0, and because q is a power of 2 every element in Fq is a square,
and therefore we have that a non-zero multiple of B1, that we name H1, satisfies
(HI11 |HI11 ) = 1.
Next, suppose by induction that we have found ` codewords H1, . . . , H` of C,
1 ≤ ` ≤ r − 1 and a subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , `} such that
1. for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ `, (HIi |HIj ) = δij
2. for every i = 1, . . . , `, for every i + 1 ≤ j ≤ r, the j-th coordinate of Hi
satisfies Hij = 0.
We show that we can add a codeword H`+1 to H1, . . . , H` and possibly add coor-
dinate `+ 1 to I, while keeping properties 1 and 2 above satisfied. This will prove
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the Lemma by induction. To this end consider the linear combination
Λ = B`+1 +
∑`
i=1
λiHi.
There clearly is a choice of λ1, . . . , λ` ∈ Fq that makes ΛI orthogonal to HI1 , . . . , HI` .
If (ΛI |ΛI) 6= 0 leave I unchanged, otherwise adjoin the element ` + 1 to it.
Property 2 ensures that the orthogonality relations (ΛI |HIi ) = 0, i = 1 . . . ` are
unchanged. The required code vector is H`+1 = λΛ where λ is chosen so that
λ2(ΛI |ΛI) = 1.
Now suppose the code C has dimension r and square distance dˆ > r. We always
have d ≥ dˆ (consider x ∗ x where x is a minimum weight codeword of C) so that
Lemma 8 applies and we obtain a punctured code of C that has an orthonormal
basis, that has dimension r and square distance at least dˆ − r, since it should be
clear that puncturing and taking the square yields the same code as taking the
square and then puncturing. In particular if we start from the codes of [20] that
are guaranteed to have dˆ at least equal to a linear function of n, we may first take
a subcode to ensure a dimension that stays linear in n but satisfies r < dˆ, and
then puncturing will yield a code with square minimum distance that still behaves
as a linear function of n. Actual rates are computed at the end of this section.
Protocol P1 works under the assumption that Bob is honest. Now Bob may cheat
in Step 2, and ask for any mixture of x` and y` of his choice, that may differ from
(10) and (11), in an attempt to obtain some mixture of the two secrets, e.g. some
bits of s and some bits of t, or some sums of the bits of s and t. The modified
protocol P ′1 described next makes sure he cannot do anything of the kind.
4.2 Defeating Bob’s cheating strategies
The protocol P ′1 below simply adds a compression function to the secrets s and t
of protocol P1. The compression function is revealed to Bob only after protocol
P1 has been performed.
Protocol P ′1. Consider the setting of Protocol P1. Alice has two secrets
s˜ =
s˜1...
s˜u
 , t˜ =
t˜1...
t˜u

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with coefficients in Fm2 , and u = r(12 − δ).
1. Alice picks uniformly at random two matrices, Ms and Mt both of dimen-
sion r(1
2
− δ)× r, with coefficients in F2, and two r-dimensional vectors
s, t ∈ (Fm2 )r such that
Mss = s˜, Mtt = t˜.
2. Alice and Bob perform Protocol P1 with s and t computed above, so that
Bob gets either s or t.
3. Finally Alice sends Bob the matrices Ms and Mt, and Bob computes
Mss = s˜ (or Mtt = t˜)
to get the secret he wanted.
Suppose Bob is dishonest. In Step 3 of P1, Bob asks Alice either x` or y` via
the protocol P0. He could cheat by asking for some choice of x` and y` that does
not correspond to (10) or (11). As a result, in Step 5, Bob will get some vector v
whose components v` are either x` or y`. Specifically, from (9) we have that Bob
gets exactly a vector
v = x + (s + t)ᵀH ∗ u
where u is an arbitrary row-vector chosen by Bob, the column vector s + t is
chosen by Alice independently of x (since t can be any quantity independent of
s), and H ∗ u can be taken to be the matrix deduced from H by replacing its
`th column by the zero column whenever u` = 0. With this convention we have
((s + t)H) ∗ u = (s + t)(H ∗ u).
Consider now Hvᵀ. We have
Hvᵀ = Hxᵀ + H(H ∗ u)ᵀ(s + t)
= s + V (s + t)
= (I +V )s + V t
where V is the r×r matrix H(H∗u)ᵀ over F2. We will not attempt to characterize
the set of possible matrices V that arise in this way and simply assume that V
can be any binary r × r matrix. Let us also write
Hvᵀ = Us + V t (12)
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and remark that knowledge of s + t gives us (s + t)ᵀH = x + y and enables us to
turn v into its complement vector, i.e. with coordinate y` for every v` = x` and
with coordinate x` for every v` = y`. Therefore, for any fixed u, there is a bijection
between the couples (x, s+t) and (v, s+t), both of which live in (Fm2 )n+r. We also
remark that s + t and s + V (s + t) gives us s and therefore t: therefore the map
(s, t) 7→ (s+t, Us+V t) is one-to-one. The conclusion is that knowledge of v gives
us Us + V t, and no additional knowledge on s + t, hence no additional knowledge
on the couple (s, t). Henceforth we forget all properties of (U, V ) stemming from
their particular structure, except for this last fact.
We now prove that:
Proposition 9. One of the following holds:
• either rankV ≤ r/2, in which case Bob has no information on t˜, even when
he is given s˜, meaning precisely that
H(T˜ |S˜,O) ≥ rm
(
1
2
− δ
)
− f1(r, δ)− nf0(ε,m)
where f1(r, δ) is exponentially small in r, and where f0(ε,m) is from Theo-
rem 4.
• or rankV > r/2, in which case Bob has no information on s˜, even when he
is given t˜, which means
H(S˜|T˜ ,O) ≥ rm
(
1
2
− δ
)
− f1(r, δ)− nf0(ε,m).
We will rely on the following classical lemma (e.g. [15, Ch. 14, exercice 8]):
Lemma 10. Let B,C be a × b and a × c binary matrices respectively, and let
A = [B|C] be the a × (b + c) matrix that is obtained from concatenating B and
C. Suppose 0 ≤ b < a < b + c. Let B be a fixed matrix of rank b, and let
C be chosen randomly and uniformly among all binary a × c matrices. Then
P (rankA < a) ≤ 1/2b+c−a.
Proof of Proposition 9.
1. rankV ≤ r/2. Suppose that Bob knows s which is stronger than Bob knowing
s˜, that is
H(T˜ |S˜,O) ≥ H(T˜ |S,O).
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We first suppose that Bob’s observation O reduces to v, i.e. the collection
of n binary m-tuples v` that are either x` or y`, whichever he has requested
when executing the `-th instance of protocol P0. Then between Us + V t and
s, Bob obtains the fixed quantity V t and for him t is uniformly distributed
among vectors of the form τ + (KerV )m, where we have identified V with a
linear map Fr2 → Fr2 and where τ is any fixed preimage of V t. The secret
t˜ may therefore be any quantity in Mt(τ + (KerV )
m). Let M be the set of
matrices Mt such that Mt(KerV ) is the full image space F
r( 1
2
−δ)
2 . Since we have
supposed rankV ≤ r/2, we have dim KerV ≥ r/2, and there must exist at least
r/2 linearly independent vectors in KerV . Consider the images by Mt of these
r/2 vectors: they make up the columns of a uniform random r(1/2− δ)× r/2
matrix, which by Lemma 10, is of full-rank r(1/2− δ) with probability at least
1− 2−rδ. In other words we have P (Mt ∈M) ≥ 1− 2−rδ. We therefore have:
H(T˜ |S,O) = H(MtT |S,O)
= P (Mt ∈M)H(T˜ |S,O,Mt ∈M)
+P (Mt 6∈ M)H(T˜ |S,O,Mt 6∈ M)
≥ (1− 1
2rδ
)H(T˜ |S,O,Mt ∈M) = (1− 12rδ )mr(12 − δ)
≥ m( r
2
− δ)− mr
2rδ
H(T˜ |S,O) ≥ m( r
2
− δ)− f1(r, δ). (13)
2. rankV > r/2. Bob again obtains z = Us + V t, and we suppose this time that
he is given t˜ = Mtt. Our goal is to show that Bob obtains no information on
s˜ = Mss. First consider that the possible values of t given t˜ are τ + (KerMt)
m,
for some fixed τ such that Mtτ = t˜. The possible values of V t are V τ +
(V KerMt)
m. We have dim(V KerMt) = dim KerMt − dim(KerV ∩KerMt).
Now the kernel KerMt is a random subspace of Fr2 of dimension at least r(12 +δ).
Since we have supposed rankV > r/2 we have dim KerV < r/2. Choose a basis
of KerV , and add arbitrary vectors of Fr2 so as to obtain a basis B of some
subspace 〈B〉 of Fr2 of dimension r/2 that contains KerV . Applying Lemma 10
we obtain that 〈B〉+ KerMt is of full rank r with probability at least 1−1/2rδ.
In this case we have dim(〈B〉 ∩ KerMt) = dim(KerMt) + dim〈B〉 − r =
dim(KerMt) − r/2. Since KerV ⊂ 〈B〉 we also have dim(KerV ∩ KerMt) ≤
dim(KerMt)− r/2. Therefore,
dim(V KerMt) = dim KerMt − dim(KerV ∩KerMt) ≥ r/2.
Now we have that the set {s, Us +V t = z} is an Fm2 expansion of a translate of
an F2-vector space of dimension at least dim(V KerMt). As before, the image
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under the random matrix Ms of a fixed subspace of dimension at least r/2 has
maximum dimension r(1/2 − δ) with probability at least 1 − 2−rδ. So with
probability (1−2−rδ)2 both random matrices Mt and Ms behave as desired and
s˜ can be any vector in (Fm2 )r(
1
2
−δ) with uniform probability. Therefore similarly
to (13) we obtain
H(S˜|T,O) ≥ m( r
2
− δ)− f1(r, δ). (14)
The estimates (13) and (14) have been obtained with the assumption that Bob’s
observation reduces to v. In the actual protocol, for every execution of protocol P0,
Bob obtains v`, which is equal to one of the two secrets x` or y`, plus f0(m, ε) bits
of information on the other secret, as guaranteed by Theorem 4. By the same
argument as that preceding Corollary 7, consisting of viewing all the individual
instances of Protocol P0 as the successive instantiations of a discrete memoryless
channel without feedback, we have that Bob obtains at most nf0(m, ε) additional
bits of information, hence the expressions in Proposition 9.
Rate of the oblivious transfer protocol P ′1. The protocol P
′
1 is instantiated
with two secrets of length u = r(1
2
− δ), where r is the length of the secrets in the
protocol P1 and δ is a positive number that can be taken arbitrarily close to 0.
Thus, the rate of P ′1 can be arbitrarily close to
R′1 =
R1
2
.
Now the protocol P1 requires n uses of the protocol P0, where n is the length of
the [n, r, d] code C. The total length of a secret is r times the length of a secret of
P0. Therefore the overall rate of the protocol P1 is
R1 = RR0
where R0 is the rate of P0 and R = r/n is the rate of the code C. From Section 3
we have that R0 can be taken arbitrarily close to the limiting value R0 = 0.108,
and from [20] we have an infinite family of linear codes of length n and square
minimum distance dˆ ≥ n/1575 and dimension > dˆ. From the discussion at the
end of Section 4.1 we get that a punctured version of the codes of [20] with a rate
R arbitrarily close to 1/1575 will satisfy all the conditions of protocol P1. We get
therefore the achievable rate:
R1 = 0.108
1575
≈ 0.69 10−4
and hence R′1 ≈ 0.34 10−4.
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4.3 Summary and Comments
Let N denote the total number of bits sent over the noisy channel during protocol
P ′1. We have N = 4n0n, where the number of bits sent by Alice over the noisy
channel is 4n0 for each instance of protocol P0, and n is the number of times
protocol P0 is repeated. We have set n = n
2
0 to be specific, but this is somewhat
arbitrary, and any value n = nα0 , α > 1 would yield similar asymptotic guarantees.
These guarantees are the following:
1. When Bob follows the protocol precisely, he obtains the secret he wishes for
with probability at least 1−exp(−Nα) for some 0 < α < 1. This is obtained by
using polar codes in protocol P0 that achieve the capacity of the least noisy (in
effect erasureless) channel. We recall that this family of codes is constructive
and can be decoded in quasi-linear time, with a probability of a decoding error
that is guaranteed to be subexponential in the blocklength, i.e. exp(−nβ0 ), see
[23, Theorem 1]. The probability of a decoding error on at least one of the
instances of P0 scales therefore as exp(−Nα).
2. Theorem 4 and Proposition 9 guarantee that whatever Bob does, on at least one
of the two secrets he obtains at most a vanishing number of bits of information,
that behaves like exp(−cmα) where m is the secret size, 0 < α < 1, and c
is a constant that is determined by how close we are to the limiting rate R′1
computed in the last subsection. In other words, c is dependent on the values
of ε and δ in Theorem 4 and Proposition 9.
3. The protocol is protected against a cheating Alice in the following sense: Bob
will declare Alice a cheater if he receives a total number of erased symbols that
exceeds a certain threshold τ . If Alice cheats so as to uncover which of the
two secrets Bob is trying to obtain, she will almost surely be accused, i.e. with
probability 1 − exp(−n0) = 1 − exp(−N1/3). It may happen that an honest
Alice will be wrongly accused of cheating by Bob, but this happens with a
vanishingly small probability that scales as exp(−n0) = exp(−N1/3).
In the next section we improve upon the rate R′1 computed in Section 4.2 by
modifying protocol P1, so as to allow us to replace the binary code C by a q-
ary one: codes with large square distances are easier to construct in the q-ary
case and better rates are obtained. The techniques require to measure leakage
of information to Bob and the probabilities of Alice successfully cheating without
being found out, or of Alice being wrongly accused of cheating are unchanged, and
we will compute the new limiting rates without explicitly mentioning that we need
to be ε and δ away from them as in Theorem 4 and Proposition 9.
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5 A Positive Rate q-ary Oblivious Transfer Pro-
tocol
Let q be a power of 2. Protocol P2 below is a q-ary variant of protocol P1: it
relies upon a version of protocol P0 that is a 1-out-of-q oblivious transfer protocol,
that, like P0 does not protect against Alice’s cheating strategy. Let us denote P
q
0
this protocol: we shall show later in this section how to transform the original
protocol P0 into its q-ary version P
q
0 . The matrix H is this time a matrix over the
field on q elements, it is the generating matrix of a code C, with otherwise the
same requirements as in the binary case, namely that the rows of H make up an
orthonormal basis of C and the square distance dˆ of C grows linearly in n. The
integer m is now the length of the q secrets in protocol P q0 .
Protocol P2. Consider the same setting as Protocol P1, over Fq instead of F2,
that is the r×n generating matrix H of the code C has coefficients in Fq, and
the two secrets s and t have length r, with coefficients in Fmq .
1. As in protocol P1, Alice picks uniformly at random a vector x ∈ (Fmq )n
such that
Hxᵀ = s.
She then computes the q− 1 vectors yi, i = 2, . . . , q− 1, with coefficients
in Fmq , given by
yi = x + λi
r∑
j=1
(sj + tj)Hj,
where λi runs through every non-zero element of Fq. We set λ1 = 1, so
that y1 coincides with y in protocol P1. We write yi = [yi1, yi2, . . . , yin].
2. Bob computes a q-ary vector u = [u1, . . . , un] which is orthogonal to Cˆ.
3. If Bob wants the secret s, then he asks Alice through the protocol P q0 for
the vector x + u ∗ (x + y1). Equivalently, whenever u` = λi, Bob asks for
the string yi`. If Bob wants the secret t instead, he asks for the vector
y1 + u ∗ (x + y1).
4. After n rounds of the protocol P q0 , Alice has sent Bob the requested n-
tuple v = [v1, . . . , vn] which has again exactly the expression given by
(10) and (11).
5. Once Bob gets v, he computes Hvᵀ to recover s or t.
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Protocol P ′2.
The protocol is is obtained from protocol P2 in exactly the same way as protocol
P ′1 is obtained from P1, with the two secrets s˜ and t˜ of length u = r(
1
2
− δ)
having their coefficients in Fmq .
We first argue that Bob will indeed recover the secrets by computing Hvᵀ. The
proof from Protocol P1 carries through quite straightforwardly. As previously, we
have that x + y1 belongs to the code C, and since u is orthogonal to Cˆ, we have
that the scalar product of a row of H with u ∗ (x + y1) is equal to the scalar
product of u with the ∗-product of two vectors of C, hence equals zero. Therefore
Hvᵀ is always equal to either Hxᵀ or Hyᵀ1. We have Hx
ᵀ = s by choice of x and
Hyᵀ1 = t through the orthonormal property of the rows Hi of H.
A 1-out-of-q oblivious transfer P q0 . Next, a 1-out-of-q oblivious transfer pro-
tocol is needed for Bob to obtain every vi, i = 1, . . . , n. It may be obtained by
q − 1 applications of the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol P0, as in [4]. If
x1, x2, . . . , xq are the secrets to be transferred, Alice chooses q − 1 random strings
r1, r2, . . . , rq−1 uniformly among all strings such that r1 + r2 + · · · rq−1 = xq. Then
protocol P0 is applied to the q − 1 pairs of secrets
(x1, r1), (x2 + r1, r2), . . . , (xi + r1 + · · · ri−1, ri), . . . (xq−1 + r1 + · · ·+ rq−2, rq−1).
We see that if Bob asks for the first term xi + r1 + · · · ri−1 of the i-th pair, he
loses all chance of obtaining ri, and the subsequent xj, j > i. He can obtain xi by
asking for the second term, rj, of the preceding pairs for j = 1 . . . i− 1.
Construction of the required code C. We need a code with an orthonormal
basis and a large square distance dˆ. From Lemma 8 and the discussion just after-
wards, such a code will be obtained as soon as we have a code of dimension k = r
and large square distance dˆ with k < dˆ. We also want this code to have the largest
possible dimension, so we try to obtain the code with the largest possible square
distance dˆ satisfying k ≥ dˆ, from which we will then take a subcode so as to have
k < dˆ.
We turn to algebraic geometry codes (see e.g. [13, 22]). Consider codes C(D,G)
of length n over Fq, defined to be the image of the linear evaluation map ev :
L(G)→ Fnq , f 7→ ev(f) = (f(P1), . . . , f(Pn)), where D = P1 + . . .+Pn is a divisor
on an algebraic curve X for the rational points P1, . . . , Pn, F(X ) is the function
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field of the curve X , and L(G) = {f ∈ F(X )∗, ∑P∈X νP (f)P +G ≥ 0}∪{0}, and
G some other divisor whose support is disjoint from D.
As observed in [21, Lemma 14], we have
Cˆ(D,G) = C(D,G) ∗ C(D,G) ⊂ C(D, 2G). (15)
Indeed, for c, c′ ∈ C(D,G), we have
c ∗ c′ = ev(f) ∗ ev(f ′) = (f(P1)f ′(P1), . . . , f(Pn)f ′(Pn)) = ev(ff ′),
and ff ′ ∈ F(X ) with∑
P∈X
νP (ff
′)P + 2G = (
∑
P∈X
νP (f)P +G) + (
∑
P∈X
νP (f
′)P +G) ≥ 0
showing that ff ′ ∈ L(2G).
Now the parameters of the evaluation code C(D,G) are known to satisfy, when
the degree degG of the divisor G is strictly less than n, [22, Cor. II.2.3]
d ≥ n− degG and k ≥ degG+ 1− g
where g is the genus of the algebraic curve. From (15) we therefore also have, as
long as 2 degG < n,
dˆ ≥ n− 2 degG.
To have k = dˆ we shall therefore aim for a divisor G of degree satisfying
n = 3 degG+ 1− g. (16)
Rate of the oblivious transfer Protocols P ′2. Let us first establish the rate
R of the code C. We will obtain the best result for q = 16. The Tsfasman-Vladut-
Zink bound [13, 22] tells us that we may choose curves with genus g such that
n → ∞ and n/g is arbitrarily close to √q − 1 = 3. Choosing degG as in (16)
gives us 1
n
degG→ 4/9 and k ≥ degG+ 1− g gives us a rate at least 1/9 for the
code. The actual code used in the protocol is possibly a punctured version, but
since the rate can only increase by puncturing up to the minimum distance, we
may guarantee a rate arbitrarily close to R = 1/9 for the code C.
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Now the overall rate of the protocol P2 is
R2 = 2rm
n# channel uses for P q0
=
2rm
n(q − 1)# channel uses for P0
=
1
q − 1RR0
where R0 is the rate of protocol P0. Hence,
R2 = 1
9× 150.108 = 0.8 10
−3.
The rate R′2 of the protocol P ′2 is R′2 = R2/2, hence
R′2 = 0.4 10−3.
6 Concluding comments
Binary codes C with large rate and such that Cˆ has a large minimum distance
would of course yield improved rates for protocol P ′1. How large can these rates
be is a very intriguing question.
Apart from exhibiting codes C with some extraordinary Cˆ behaviour, improving
upon the rates of this paper probably involves some alternative approaches to the
problem, or other ways of using the potential of q-ary codes.
As discussed in Section 4.3, the probabilities of something going wrong (Bob does
not get his secret, Alice cheats, Bob falsely accuses Alice of cheating) are subex-
ponential in the total number N of transmitted bits. An interesting avenue of
research would be to find explicit achievable rates that guarantee an exponential
behaviour for these failure probabilities.
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 3
Recall that the channel randomly introduces e erasures and a number of errors
on the non-erased symbols. Let us first modify slightly the channel by assuming
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a fixed number w of errors, chosen uniformly among the
(
n−e
w
)
possible choices,
instead of binomially distributed errors.
Build a bipartite graph, consisting of the 2nR codewords as vertices on the left, and
on the right all possible ternary strings over the alphabet {0, 1, ∗} with e erasures
(an erasure is represented by the ∗ symbol). thus the right hand side of the graph
has (
n
e
)
2n−e
vertices. We put an edge connecting a codeword, i.e. a left vertex, to a ternary
string if the ternary string can be obtained from the codeword by erasing e coeffi-
cients, and flipping w others. There are thus
(
n
e
)(
n−e
w
)
outgoing edges from every
codeword node, and a total of
2nR
(
n
e
)(
n− e
w
)
(17)
edges connecting the left and right sides of the bipartite graph. Define r such that(
n
e
)
2n−e2r = 2nR
(
n
e
)(
n− e
w
)
(18)
and assume parameters have been chosen such that r is positive.
Now Alice picks a codeword c uniformly at random and sends it over the channel:
one error pattern of weight w and e erasures will happen, all of them are equally
likely. This means that after transmission an edge of the graph has been chosen
uniformly among the total number (17) of edges. We now argue that most edges
are connected to a right vertex with large degree.
Let α > 0. The number of edges connected to binary strings on the right of the
graph, whose degree is smaller than 2r−α is N1 +2N2 +3N3 + . . .+2r−αN2r−α where
Ni counts the number of right nodes whose degree is i, and
∑
Ni =
(
n
e
)
2n−e. Since
i ≤ 2r−α for every i, N1 +2N2 +3N3 + . . .+2r−N2r−α ≤ 2r−α
∑
Ni = 2
r−α(n
e
)
2n−e.
The number of edges connected to right nodes whose degree is bigger than 2r−α is
then bounded from below by(
n
e
)(
2n−e2r − 2r−α2n−e) = (n
e
)
2n−e2r(1− 2−α).
This shows that for any 0 < α ≤ r, with probability at least 1−1/2α, Bob receives
a vector v such that, for any codeword c,
P (CX = c |Z = z) ≤ 1
2r−α
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where CX is the input to the channel, with uniform distribution on the code C,
and Z is the random variable consisting of the received vector.
If the number w of errors equals the expected number of errors for n−e transmitted
bits over a BSC, i.e. w = p(n− e), then we get from (18)
r = R− (1− e/n)(1− h(p)) + o(1).
This proves a version of Lemma 3 for a constant, rather than binomially distributed
number of errors. For a binomially distributed number of errors, i.e. the result
of an actual binary symmetric channel, we may proceed as above by making the
bipartite graph weighted. We put an edge for every possible number of errors
w, 0 ≤ w ≤ n − e, and associate to every such edge the weight pw(1 − p)n−e−w.
Concentration of measure around the mean number p(n− e) of errors ensures the
same behaviour as in the constant error case: we leave out the cumbersome details.
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